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Abstract
Our aim is to emphasize the role of mathematical models in physics,
especially models of geometry and probability. We briefly compare de-
velopments of geometry and probability by pointing to similarities and
differences: from Euclid to Lobachevsky and from Kolmogorov to Bell.
In probability Bell played the same role as Lobachevsky in geometry.
In fact, violation of Bell’s inequality implies the impossibility to apply
the classical probability model of Kolmogorov (1933) to quantum phe-
nomena. Thus quantum probabilistic model (based on Born’s rule) is
an example of non-Kolmogorovian model of probability, similarly to
the Lobachevskian model – the first example of non-Euclidean model
of geometry. We also discuss coupling of the classical probabilistic
model with classical (Boolean) logic. The Kolmogorov model of prob-
ability is based on the set-theoretic presentation of the Boolean logic.
In this framework violation of Bell’s inequality implies the impossibil-
ity to use the Boolean structure of events for quantum phenomena;
instead of it, events have to be represented by linear subspaces. This
is the “probability model” interpretation of violation of Bell’s inequal-
ity. We also criticize the standard interpretation – an attempt to add
to rigorous mathematical probability models additional elements such
as (non)locality and (un)realism. Finally, we compare embeddings of
non-Euclidean geometries into the Euclidean space with embeddings
of the non-Kolmogorovian probabilities (in particular, quantum prob-
ability) into the Kolmogorov probability space. As an example, we
consider the CHSH-test.
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1 Introduction
The argument which will be presented in this paper, namely, that vi-
olations of Bell type inequalities [1], [2] signal us that the classical
model of probability [3] (Kolmogorov, 1933) is inapplicable to quan-
tum phenomena, was already discussed in very detail by many authors,
see, e.g., [4]–[53]. Here I try to formulate this argument so clearly as
possible. I also argue that any attempt to assign to these violations
some additional value e.g., to philosophize about (non)locality and
(un)reality, is not consistent with the mathematical model approach
to description of natural (and mental) phenomena (see [54] for a dis-
cussion).
The modern physics is based on creation of mathematical models
describing natural phenomena. We emphasize that a model has not be
identified with reality. Each model has boundaries of its application.
Thus the evolution of physics can be considered as a chain of creation
of mathematical models, finding boundaries of their applicability, and
creation of new models. Personally I think that any attempt to pro-
ceed without keeping to this mathematical modeling ideology leads to
philosophizing which only shadows the structure of theory (although
it may be generates the feeling of understanding).
From this viewpoint the Bell argument [1], [2] led to the recognition
that the classical Kolmogorov model of probability [3] which served
so well for classical statistical physics has to be rejected and one has
to use the quantum model of probability. And (!) nothing more.
Now we move to the issue of similarities and differences in the
evolutions of geometry and probability and their impact to physics.
We recall that Clifford called Lobachevsky the Copernicus of Geometry
due to the revolutionary character of his work. Lobachevsky “discov-
ered” the first non-Euclidean model which nowadays is known as the
Lobachevskian or hyperbolic geometry [55]. We also point out that he
discussed possible experiments in astrophysics to check whether the
geometry of Universe is Euclidean or Lobachevskian.1
I would call Bell the Copernicus of Probability. In fact, violation of
Bell’s inequality implies the impossibility to apply the classical prob-
ability model of Kolmogorov (1933) to quantum phenomena. Thus
the quantum probability model (based on Born’s rule) gives us an
example of non-Kolmogorovian model of probability, similarly to the
Lobachevskian model (an example of non-Euclidean model). How-
1 In 1826 he noted that it is possible to find experimentally the deviation from pi of
the sum of the angles of cosmic triangles of great size; in a later work he moved to the
opposite scale and suggested that his geometry might find application in the intimate
sphere of molecular attractions, see, e.g., [56].
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Figure 1: Nicolaus Copernicus Figure 2: John Bell
ever, there are not only similarities, but also differences. Physicists
sufficiently quickly understood that a variety of models of geometry
can be fruitfully explored. For example, the Lobachevskian geome-
try is used in special relativity. And the combination of the efforts
of mathematicians (first of all, Riemann and Hilbert) and physicists
(first of all, Einstein) led to the wide use of non-Euclidean geometries
in general relativity. At the same time physicists have no (or very
little) interest to the interpretation of quantum mechanics (QM) as a
theory based on a special non-Kolmogorovian model of probability.
We shall also discuss coupling of the classical probabilistic model
with classical (Boolean) logic. The Kolmogorov model of probability
is based on the set-theoretic presentation of the Boolean logic, the
crucial point is that events are represented by subsets of a “set of
elementary events” Ω and operations for events are classical Boolean
operations. In this framework violations of Bell-type inequalities can
be interpreted simply as a signal that one cannot use this set-theoretic
representation of events for quantum phenomena, instead of it, one
has to represent events (detections for quantum systems) by linear
subspaces (orthogonal projectors) in a complex Hilbert space.
All previous attempts, see especially [33], [35], to communicate
with the physical community about Kolmogorovness/non-Kolmogorovness
issue of Bell’s argument2 were not successful. One of the roots of
2One can also say “Boolean/non-Boolean”. It is a good place to recall that J. Boole
by himself analyzed a possibility that probabilities for some group of random observations
cannot be embedded in the Boolean algebra [57]. He even investigated the standard Bell’s
situation. There are given three dichotomous random observables. It is possible to per-
form their pairwise measurements and the corresponding joint probability distributions are
given. The natural question arises: Is it always possible to define the joint probability dis-
tribution for this triple of observables? Boole presented the inequality which is nowadays
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such miscommunication is that majority of physicists are poorly edu-
cated in probability theory (it seems that students in physics do not
have a mathematically rigorous course in probability theory, neither
in Europe nor in USA). Therefore we start the paper with a brief
presentation of the modern axiomatic approach to probability theory
[3].
Since classical probability is fundamentally based on classical logic,
rejection of the Kolmogorov model of probability automatically im-
plies rejection of the Boolean model of logic. Thus Bell’s “no-go the-
orem” tells us that for analysis of results of quantum observations it
is impossible to use the Boolean laws. In particular, the conjunction-
disjunction distributivity is violated. There is again nothing mystical.
The Boolean logic is just one special model of thought [57]. It was pro-
posed by mathematician and it spread widely, because of its clearness
and matching intuition. However, in cognitive science and psychol-
ogy it was found that humans often make decisions by violating laws
of Boolean logic [59] (and in particular Bell’s type inequalities [60]).
Hence, there is nothing surprising that some natural phenomena can
be described by novel (non-Boolean) models of logic. Such formal
logic was created by von Neumann [61], see also von Neumann and
Birkhoff [62]. From this viewpoint, Bell’s “no-go theorem” supports
(indirectly via coupling of probability with logic) the interpretation of
quantum theory as a departure from classical to special nonclassical
(quantum) logic. However, inter-relation of classical and nonclassical
logics is not the main topic of this paper; we shall concentrate on
probability. For reader’s convenience, we presents basics of quantum
logic in the appendix.
The final theme of this paper is about a possibility to “embed”
a noclassical probabilistic model, e.g., quantum probability, into the
classical (Kolmogorov) probability model. From the viewpoint of
the presented analogy geometry-probability, it would not be surpris-
ing if a non-Kolmogorovian model were embedded in some (may be
nonunique) way into the Kolmogorovian model. We know that non-
Euclidean geometries can be modeled by using surfaces in the Eu-
clidean space. As was shown in [12], [45] even in this aspect probabil-
ity is similar to geometry; it is really possible to embed, e.g., quantum
probability into the classical probability model. The embedding pro-
posed in these papers is based on treatment of quantum probabilities
(correlations) as conditional classical probabilities (correlations). In
known as Bell’s inequality as a necessary condition for the existence of this probability.
Later this problem, of the existence of the joint probability distribution, was studied in
very details by Vorob’jev [58], for any group of observables taking the finite number of
values.
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particular, the EPR-Bohm correlations used in Bell’s “no-go theorem”
can be treated in this way. In this paper we present the construction
proposed in [12], [45] in the compact form.
It may be useful to remark that after the appearance of the arXiv-
preprint [63] I received a few critical comments on the title of this
paper, this is issue is discussed in section 9.4.
2 Methodology of classical probability
theory
The reader may be surprised that by discussing Bell’s type inequalities
we do not say practically any word about hidden variables, see only
section 9.3. One of the main reasons for this is that classical probabil-
ity theory does not admire at all hidden parameters, may be opposite
to classical statistical physics. For example, how does classical prob-
ability theory describe the random experiment on coin tossing? Does
it present the space of hidden parameters leading to various results of
coin tossing? Not at all! It uses so to say the operational description
based solely on the “results of measurements”, head (H) or tail (T).
So, the space of “elemenraty events” for the random experiment with
n-times tossing consists of vectors ω = (x1, ..., xn), where xj = H,T.
We can say that classical probability theory does not like counrefac-
tuals. As another example, consider the classical Brownian motion.
To construct the classical probability space, we do not try to present
the space of hidden parameters generating the trajectories of Brown-
ian particles. Such trajectories by themselves are used as elementary
events. This is again a kind of the operational description. It involves
as much as possible information which can be gained from measure-
ments. Classical probabilist would never discuss results which would
appear if the experimental context were changed. Andrei Kolmogorov
emphasized that each experimental context induces its own probabil-
ity space [3], see also [35], [41], [64]. Although Kolmogorov had never
discussed explicitly incompatibility of experimental contexts, it seems
that such a possibility was completely clear for him [3].3
3One may be curious whether in classical probability the probabilistic results obtained
for incompatible experimental contexts (in other words described by different probability
spaces) are used at all. My position was that from the classical probability viewpoint to
combine incompatible probabilistic data is meaningless; in particular, to put correlations
collected in incompatible experiments in a single inequality. However, at least for the first
part of the previous statement my position was weaken after an exciting recent debate
with Richard Gill who pointed that in classical statistics data collected for incompatible
experimental contexts are used to compare outputs for different contexts, see section 9.1
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We can say that in classical probability theory the problem of hid-
den variables does not arise, because the operational description based
on the measured quantities is simpler and this is the main reason for
its use. So, one simply is not interested whether hidden variables ex-
ist or not, since there is a possibility to use simple and self-consistent
operational description. This position is surprisingly close to Bohr’s
position [65]. It seems that Bohr would not demonstrate any interest
to Bell’s inequality, since Bohr was completely fine with the opera-
tional representation of quantum probabilities.
Nevertheless, if one likes it is possible to treat the elementary
events of the classical probability model for violation of CHSH-inequality
as hidden variables. However, such “hidden variables” cannot be rep-
resented solely by using the degrees of freedom of quantum systems,
e.g., pairs of entangled photons. They include additional parameters
determined by the experimental context, cf. [], namely, parameters
of random generators for selections of experimental settings; in this
case the pairs of angles for polarization beam splitters. Such hidden
variables are in some sense nonlocal, since one random generator is
located in one lab and another in another lab. However, this is sim-
ply completely classical nonlocality of the experimental context which
has nothing to do with so-called “quantum nonlocality.” At the same
time quantum observables are represented by local classical random
variables, each of them depends only on functioning of the random se-
lection generator located in the lab, where this variable is measured.
We also remark that the presented methodology of treatment of
random experiments is heavily explored in one special interpretation
of quantum mechanics, namely, the consistent histories interpretation,
see especially the monograph of Bob Griffiths [66]. Our explanation of
violation of Bell’s inequality is similar to the one used in the consistent
histories approach to quantum mechanics [66]: the existence of incon-
sistent families of histories implies non-Kolmogorovness. However, the
adherences of the consistent histories approach are fine with the recog-
nition of non-Kolmogorovness, they did not constructed embeddings
of inconsistent histories in one “large Kolmogorov probability space.”
3 Boolean logic and Kolmogorovian prob-
ability
In 19th century George Boole wrote the book [57], in which he for-
malized the semantics of classical logic, he also formulated the laws of
for details. (Of course, one has to have in mind that statistics and probability may differ
essentially in their methodologies for treating of outputs of random experiments.)
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probability based on this logic.
One of the most important futures of Boolean logic is that it serves
as the basis of the modern probability theory [3]: the representation
of events by sets, subsets of some set Ω, so called sample space, or
space of elementary events, The system of sets representing events,
say F , matches with the operations of Boolean logics; F is so-called
σ-algebra of sets4. It is closed with respect to the (Boolean) operations
of (countable) union, intersection, and complement (or in logical terms
“and”, “or”, “no”). Thus the first lesson for a physics student is that
by applying any theorem of probability theory, e.g., the law of large
numbers, one has to be aware that Boolean logic is in the use. The
set-theoretic model of probability was presented by Andrei Nikolaevich
Kolmogorov in 1933 [3]; it is based on the following two natural (from
the Boolean viewpoint) axioms:
• AK1) events are represented as elements of a σ-algebra and op-
erations for events are described by Boolean logic;
• AK2) probability is represented as a probabilistic measure.
We remind that a probabilistic measure p is a (countably) additive
function on a σ-algebra F :
p(∪∞j=Aj) =
∞∑
j=
p(Aj) for Aj ∈ F , Ai ∩Aj = ∅, i 6= j,
which is valued in [0, 1] and normalized by 1, p(Ω) = 1.
The triple P = (Ω,F , p) is called (Kolmogorov) probability space.
We also remind the definition of a random variable as a measurable
function, a : Ω→ R. In classical probability theory random variables
represent observables.
Here measurability has the following meaning. The set of real
numbers R is endowed with the Borel σ-algebra B : the minimal σ-
algebra containing all open and closed intervals. Then for any A ∈ B
its inverse image a−1(A) ∈ F . This gives the possibility to define on B
the probability distribution of a random variable, pa(A) = p(a
−1(A)).
The mathematical expectation (average) of a random variable ξ is
defined as its integral: Eξ =
∫
Ω ξ(ω)dp(ω).
Finally, we point to an exceptional role which is played by condi-
tional probability in the Kolmogorov model. This sort of probabilities
is not derived in any way from “usual probability”; conditional prob-
ability is per definition given by the Bayes formula:
P (B|C) = P (B ∩ C)/P (C), P (C) > 0. (1)
4Here the symbol σ encodes “countabile”. In American terminology such systems of
subsets are called σ-fields.
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By Kolmogorov’s interpretation it is the probability of an event B to
occur under the condition that an event C has occurred. One can im-
mediately see that this formula is one of strongest exhibitions of the
Boolean structure of the model; one cannot even assign conditional
probability to an event without using the Boolean operation of inter-
section.
Thus the second lesson for a physics student is that probability is
an axiomatic theory, as, e.g., geometry.
4 CHSH-inequality as a theorem of Kol-
mogorov probability theory
Let P = (Ω,F , p) be a Kolmogorov probability space. For two random
variables A and B, we set
< A,B >= E(AB) =
∫
Ω
A(ω)B(ω)dp(ω).
Theorem 1. (CHSH-inequality) Let A(i), B(j), i, j = 1, 2, be ran-
dom variables with values in [-1,1]. Then the corresponding combina-
tion of correlation
S =< A(1), B(1) > + < A(1), B(2) > + < A(2), B(1) > − < A(2), B(2) >,
(1)
satisfies the CHSH-inequality:
|S| ≤ 2. (2)
Proof. It is easy to show that for any quadruple of random vari-
ables valued in [-1,1] the following inequality holds:
2 ≤ A(1)(ω)B(1)(ω)+A(1)(ω)B(2)(ω)+A(2)(ω)B(1)(ω)−A(2)(ω)B(2)(ω) ≤ 2.
By integrating this inequality with respect to the probability measure
p we obtain (2).
5 From Euclid to Lobachevesky and
from Kolmogorov to Bell
To understand better the axiomatic nature of the modern set-theoretic
model of probability, it is useful to make comparison with another
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axiomatic theory - geometry. We can learn a lot from history of de-
velopment of geometry. Of course, the biggest name in geometry is
Euclid. His axiomatics of geometry was considered as the only pos-
sible during about two thousand years. It became so common that
people started to identify Euclidean model of geometry with physical
space. In particular, Immanuel Kant presented deep philosophic ar-
guments [67] that physical space is Euclidean. The Euclidean dogma
was rejected as the result of internal mathematical activity, the study
of a possibility of derivation of one of axioms from others. This ax-
iom was the famous fifth postulate: through a point not on a line,
there is precisely one line parallel to the given one. Nikolay Ivanovich
Lobachevsky was the first who demonstrated that this postulate can
be replaced with one of its negations. This led him to a new geomet-
ric axiomatics, the model which nowadays is known as Lobachevsky
geometry (or hyperbolic geometry). Thus the Euclidean geometry
started to be treated as just one of possible models of geometry. And
this discovery revolutionized first mathematics (with contributions of
Gauss, Bolyai, and especially Riemann) and then physics (Minkowski,
Einstein, Hilbert).
This geometry lesson tells us that there is no reason to expect that
the Kolmogorovian model is the only possible axiomatic model of prob-
ability. One can expect that by playing with the Kolmogorovian ax-
ioms as Lobachevsky played with the Euclidean ones mathematicians
could create non-Kolmogorovian models of probability which may be
useful for various applications, in particular in physics. However, in
the case of probability the historical pathway of development of ge-
ometry was not repeated. Mathematicians did not have two thousand
years to rethink the Kolmogorovian axiomatics...
6 Non-Kolmogorovian nature of quan-
tum probability; no-go theorems
New physics, QM, intervened brutally in the mathematical kingdom.
The probabilistic structure of QM did not match with classical prob-
ability theory based on the set-theoretic approach of Kolmogorov. At
the first stage of development of QM this mismatching was not so
visible. The first clink came in the form of Born’s rule:
p(x) = |ψ(x)|2, (1)
where ψ(x) is the wave function and p(x) is the probability to detect a
particle at the point x. Here not the probability, but the wave function
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is primary. What is encoded in this presence of complex amplitudes
behind probabilities obtained in quantum measurements?
The first who paid attention to peculiarity of the probabilistic
structure of QM comparing with the probabilistic structure of clas-
sical statistical mechanics was John von Neumann [61]. In particu-
lar, he generalized Born’s rule to quantum observables represented by
Hermitian operators; for observable represented by an operator with
purely discrete spectrum, the probability to obtain the value λ as the
result of measurement is given as
p(λ) = ‖Pλψ‖2, (2)
where Pλ is the projector corresponding to the eigenvalue λ. (Here
A =
∑
λ λPλ).
In his seminal book [61] von Neumann pointed out that, oppo-
site to classical statistical mechanics where randomness of results of
measurements is a consequence of variability of physical parameters
such as, e.g., the position and momentum of a classical particle, in
QM the assumption about the existence of such parameters (for a
moment may be still hidden and unapproachable by existing measure-
ment devices) leads to contradiction. This statement presented in [61]
is known as von Neumann no-go theorem, theorem about impossibility
to go beyond the description of quantum phenomena based on quan-
tum states: it is impossible to construct a theoretical model providing
a finer description of those phenomena than given by QM.5 Thus von
Neumann was sure that it is impossible to construct a classical prob-
ability measure on the space of some hidden variables which would
reproduce probabilities obtained in quantum measurements.
Later this statement was confirmed by other no-go theorems, e.g.,
of Bell [2].
Bell’s “no-go theorem” says that Bell type inequalities, e.g., the
CHSH-inequality (2), which are derived in Kolmogorovian model of
probability are violated for correlations calculated in the quantum prob-
ability model.
Thus we conclude that the former model of probability has to be
rejected as inapplicable to these correlations and that the latter model
(which is non-Kolmogorovian) has to be in the use. From the view-
point of the scientific methodology based on the transition from one
5This theorem was criticized for unphysical assumptions used by von Neumann to
approach his no-go conclusion; especially strong critique was from the side of John Bell
[2], the author of another famous no-go theorem; calmer critical arguments were presented
by Leslie Ballentine [68]. (We also remark that, although in the modern literature the von
Neumann statement is called “theorem”, in the German eddition he called it “ansatz”.)
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mathematical model to another, this is a natural step of the scientific
evolution. If one try to go beyond this methodology and to interpret
the violation of Bell’s inequality not simply as generating the afore-
mentioned transition from one model of probability to another, but to
attract additional elements (which do not have formal mathematical
meaning) such as (non)locality or (un)realism, then he starts a ran-
dom walk in jungles of arguments and counter-arguments. And this
happened in debates on Bell’s argument.
7 Kolmogorovization of quantum prob-
ability
7.1 Embedding: Geometry-probability anal-
ogy
As we pointed out in the introduction, the geometry-probability anal-
ogy stimulates us to construct embeddings of the quantum model of
probability into the classical probability model. On the other hand,
two models of probability seems to be so different that such embed-
dings are impossible. In the classical model events are represented
by sets and operations for events are based on classical logic, in the
quantum model events are represented by subspaces and operations
for them violate the laws of classical logic, they are based on quan-
tum logic of von Neumann-Birkhoff, see the appendix. In the classical
model probability is given by a measure on a σ-algebra of events and in
the quantum model it is given by Born’s rule, by the operator trace.
However, again the geometry-probability analogy tells us that such
differences may be not a problem.
We know that a non-Euclidean geometry having very exotic fea-
tures (from the Euclidean viewpoint) can be modeled by using surfaces
in the Euclidean space. Let us turn again to the Lobachevskian ge-
ometry; consider, for example, the so called hyperbolic plane. There
are various models of this plane based on the Euclidean plane. Con-
sider, for example, the Poincare´ disc model. It is based the interior of
a circle (in the Euclidean plane) and lines are represented by arcs of
circles that are orthogonal to the boundary circle, plus diameters of
the boundary circle. We stress that, although in this representation
the hyperbolic plane is given by a domain of the Euclidean plane, the
correspondence between the basic entities of the models is nontriv-
ial. Lines of the hyperbolic geometry are not at all straight lines of
the Euclidean geometry. Therefore if we hope to embed the quantum
model of probability into the classical model of probability, we have
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to be prepared that the quantum probability will be represented in
some nontrivial way.
As was pointed out in the introduction, besides geometry-probability
similarities, there are also differences. Before to proceed to embedding
of quantum probability into classical probability, we discuss one spe-
cialty of the Kolmogorov model.
7.2 Kolmogorov model: Coupling with exper-
iment
The quantum model describes all possible quantum measurements. We
can always select a Hilbert state space such that all possible quan-
tum observables are represented by Hermitian operators acting in this
space (more generally by POVMs). This representation of quantum
observables, all in one Hilbert space, is definitely a mathematical ide-
alization. Here even incompatible observables peacefully coexist, al-
though the joint probability distributions are well defined only for
groups of compatible observables.
Surprisingly the classical model is closer to real experimental situ-
ation6. Here we do not try to construct some huge Kolmogorov space,
i.e., a triple P = (Ω,F , p), such that all possible observables would be
represented by random variables on this space, measurable functions
a : Ω → R. As was emphasized by Kolmogorov in section 2 of his
monograph [3], each experimental context C is represented by its own
probability space PC = (ΩC ,FC , pC),. (This message was practically
washed out from modern textbooks in probability.) Of course, some-
times one needs to operate with data corresponding to a few experi-
mental contexts C1, ...., CN . They are represented by the probability
spaces PCj = (ΩCj ,FCj , pCj ). How can one construct the “unifying
probability space”? The procedure is known as randomization. First
of all one have to decide how often each experimental context will be
in the use and to assign probabilities q1, ..., qN to contexts-realizations.
This is an important step. One has to take into account the random-
ness of selection of experimental contexts. This randomness is real
and it cannot be ignored. Then by selecting the probability spaces
PCj with the probabilities qj a “big probability space” is constructed.
This fundamental coupling of the classical probability model to
experiment has to be taken into account if one wants to represent
quantum probability in a classical probability space. In the light of the
above discussion it is natural to construct the classical probabilistic
6Although typically the opposite is claimed, namely, that the quantum model is an
operational model designed just to describe results of measurements, cf. also with the
operational derivations of QM in the spirit of D’ Ariano et al. [69]
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representation for any finite group of quantum measurements. We
shall consider the most interesting example, the test to violate the
CHSH-inequality (2). (Since here we have experimental verification of
violation under the assumption of fair sampling.)
8 Classical probability model for quan-
tum correlations violating the CHSH
inequality
Now we present embedding of the probabilities (and correlations) for
joint measurements of polarizations for pairs of photons given by QM
and violating the CHSH-inequality (2) into a Kolmogorov probability
space. This construction was used in [12], [45]. Here we present it in
a clearer way.
To verify an inequality of this type, one should put in it statistical
data collected for four pairs of settings of polarization beam splitters
(PBSs):
θ11 = (θ1, θ
′
1), θ12 = (θ1, θ
′
2), θ21 = (θ2, θ
′
1), θ22 = (θ2, θ
′
2).
Here θ = θ1, θ2 and θ
′ = θ′1, θ′2 are selections of angles for orientations
of respective PBSs. The selection of the angle θi determines the cor-
responding polarization observable, aθi = ±1. There are two detectors
coupled to the PBS with the fixed θ-orientation: “up-polarization”
detector and “down-polarization” detector. A click of the up-detector
assigns to the random variable aθ(ω) the value +1 and a click of the
down-detector assigns to it the value -1. In the same way selection
of the angle θ′ determines the corresponding polarization observable,
bθ′i = ±1. Thus, in fact, the CHSH-test consists of four different ex-
periments corresponding to settings θij . Our aim is to unify these four
experiments into a single experiment with random selection of experi-
mental settings. In principle, such unification is used in modern tests
of the CHSH-inequality in which settings are selected with the aid of
random generators.
For the illustrative purpose, it is more useful to map this experi-
ment with random switching of orientations of two fixed PBSs onto the
experiment in which all settings are unified at the “hardware level”,
i.e., the experiment with 4 PBSs oriented with the angles θ1, θ2 and
θ′1, θ′2 and each PBS is equipped with its own two detectors, so there
are totally 8 detectors.
Such an experimental scheme was used in the pioneer experiment
of A. Aspect [70] with one difference: he used single channel PBSs.
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We, finally present the corresponding citation of Aspect [71], see also
[70], section “Difficulties of an ideal experiment”:
“We have done a step towards such an ideal experiment by using
the modified scheme shown on Figure 15. In that scheme, each (single-
channel) polarizer is replaced by a setup involving a switching device
followed by two polarizers in two different orientations: a and a′ on
side I, b and b′ on side II. The optical switch C1 is able to rapidly
redirect the incident light either to the polarizer in orientation a, or
to the polarizer in orientation a′. This setup is thus equivalent to a
variable polarizer switched between the two orientations a and a′. A
similar set up is implemented on the other side, and is equivalent to
a polarizer switched between the two orientations b and b′. In our
experiment, the distance L between the two switches was 13 m, and
L/c has a value of 43 ns. The switching of the light was effected by
home built devices, based on the acousto-optical interaction of the
light with an ultrasonic standing wave in water. The incidence angle
(Bragg angle) and the acoustic power, were adjusted for a complete
switching between the 0th and 1st order of diffraction.”
Figure 15 can be found in [71], p.26. The only difference of our
scheme that each of four PBSs has two output channels.
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Cette inégalité s’appliquerait sans modification à une
expérience avec d s commutat urs ptiques suivis de polariseurs
à deux voies. Un tel montage comporterait quatre cubes sépara-
teurs de polarisation, huit photomultiplicateurs, et on devrait
enregistrer simultanément seize taux de coïncidences.
Afin de ne pas compliquer excessivement l’expérience,
nous avons repris des polariseurs à une voie (Fig IV-5). Il
Fig. IV-5 : Expérience réelle, avec commutateurs
optiques et polariseurs à une voie. On enregistre en
permanence quatre taux de coincidences. Des mesures
auxiliaires avec polariseurs effacés sont nécessaires.
suffit alors d’un système de coïncidences à quatre photomultipli-
cateurs, grâce auquel on enregistre simultanément les quatre
taux de coïncidences N(a,b), N(a,b’),N(a’,b) et N(a’,b’) (les
indices ++ sont sous-entendus, puisque seules les réponses +
sont détectées).
Le passage des inégalités (IV-21) (adaptées aux pola-
riseurs à deux voies) à des inégalités applicables à la situation
Figure 3: The scheme of the pioneer experiment of A. Aspect with four beam
splitters [70].
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8.1 Experiment taking into account random
choice of settings
a). There is a source of entangled photons.
b). There are 4 PBSs and corresponding pairs of detectors for each
PBS, totally 8 detectors. PBSs are labeled as i = 1, 2 (at the
left-hand side, LHS) and j = 1, 2 (at the right-hand side, RHS).
c). Directly after source there are 2 distribution devices, one at LHS
and one at RHS. At each instance of time, t = 0, τ, 2τ, . . . each
device opens the port to only one (of two) optical fibers going
to the corresponding two PBSs. For simplicity, we suppose that
each pair of ports (i, j), (1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 1), (2, 2), can be opened
with equal probabilities7:
P(i, j) = 1/4.
Now we introduce the observables measured in this experiment.
They are modifications of the polarization observables aθi , i = 1, 2,
and bθ′j , j = 1, 2. We start with the “LHS-observables”:
1) A(i) = ±1, i = 1, 2 if the corresponding (up or down) detector
is coupled to ith PBS (at LHS) fires and the i-th channel is open;
2) A(i) = 0 if the i-th channel (at LHS) is blocked.
In the same way we define the “RHS-observables” B(j) = 0,±1,
corresponding to PBSs j = 1, 2.
Thus unification of 4 incompatible experiments of the CHSH-test
into a single experiment modifies the range of values of polarization
observables for each of 4 experiments; the new value, zero, is added
to reflect the random choice of experimental settings. We emphasize
that this value has no relation to the efficiency of detectors. In this
model we assume that detectors have 100% efficiency. The observables
take the value zero when the optical fibers going to the corresponding
PBSs are blocked.
8.2 Kolmogorov space for incompatible observ-
ables
Our aim is to construct a proper Kolmogorov probability space for
the experiment which was described in the previous section. In fact,
7In general for selection of experimental settings we can use any probability distribution,∑2
i=1,j=1P(i, j) = 1. Under the natural assumption that the distribution devices operate
independently, we introduce two probability distributions PL(i), i = 1, 2, PL(1) + PL(2) =
1, and PR(j), j = 1, 2, PR(1) + PR(2) = 1, and set P(i, j) = PL(i)PR(j).
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we shall present a general construction for combining probabilities
produced by a few experiments which can be incompatible.
In the CHSH-test we operate with probabilities pij(, 
′), , ′ = ±1,
– to get the results aθi = , bθ′j = 
′ in the experiment with the fixed
pair of orientations (θi, θ
′
j). From QM we know that, for the singlet
state, these EPR-Bohm probabilities are given by expressions:
pij(, ) =
1
2
cos2
θi − θ′j
2
, pij(,−) = 1
2
sin2
θi − θ′j
2
. (1)
However, this special form of probabilities is not important for us. Our
construction of unifying Kolmogorov probability space works well for
any collection of probabilities
pij > 0 :
∑
,′
pij(, 
′) = 1. (2)
Thus we proceed in this general situation, (2). Hence, we consider
the experiment described in section 8.1 and producing some collection
of probabilities (pij). The special choice of the probabilities (1) will
be used only to concrete considerations and to violate the CHSH-
inequality, see section 8.5.
Let us now consider the set of points Ω (the space of “elementary
events” in Kolmogorov’s terminology):
Ω = {(1, 0, ′1, 0), (1, 0, 0, ′2), (0, 2, ′1, 0), (0, 2, 0, ′2)},
where  = ±1, ′ = ±1. These points correspond to the following
events: e.g., (1, 0, 
′
1, 0) means: at LHS the PBS with i = 1 is coupled
and the PBS with i = 2 is uncoupled and the same situation is at RHS:
the PBS with j = 1 is coupled and the PBS with j = 2 is uncoupled;
the result of measurement at LHS after passing the PBS with i = 1 is
given by 1 and at RHS by 
′
1.
We define the following probability measure8 on Ω
P(1, 0, 
′
1, 0) =
1
4
p11(1, 
′
1),P(1, 0, 0, 
′
2) =
1
4
p12(1, 
′
2)
P(0, 2, 
′
1, 0) =
1
4
p21(2, 
′
1),P(0, 2, 0, 
′
2) =
1
4
p22(2, 
′
2).
8To match completely with Kolmogorov’s terminology, we have to select a σ-algebra F
of subsets of Ω representing events and define the probability measure on F . However, in
the case of a finite Ω = {ω1, ..., ωk} the system of events F is always chosen as consisting
of all subsets of Ω. To define a probability measure on such F , it is sufficient to define it
for one-point sets, (ωm) → P(ωm),
∑
mP(ωm) = 1, and to extend it by additivity: for
any subset O of Ω,P(O) =
∑
ωm∈O P(ωm).
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We now define random variables A(i)(ω), B(j)(ω) :
A(1)(1, 0, 
′
1, 0) = A
(1)(1, 0, 0, 
′
2) = 1, A
(2)(0, 2, 
′
1, 0) = A
(2)(0, 2, 0, 
′
2) = 2;
(3)
B(1)(1, 0, 
′
1, 0) = B
(1)(0, 2, 
′
1, 0) = 
′
1, B
(2)(1, 0, 0, 
′
2) = B
(2)(0, 2, 0, 
′
2) = 
′
2.
(4)
and we put these variables equal to zero in other points.
Remark. (Locality of the model) We remark that the values of the
LHS-variables A(1)(ω), A(2)(ω) depend only the first two coordinates
of ω and the values of the RHS-variables B(1)(ω), B(2)(ω) depend only
on the last two coordinates of ω. Thus the value of A(i)(ω) does not
depend on the values of B(j)(ω). They neither depend on the action of
the RHS distribution device; for the LHS-variable it is not important
which port is open or closed by the RHS distribution device. The
RHS-variables B(j)(ω) behave in the same way. Thus the random
variables under consideration are determined locally.
We find two dimensional probabilities
P(ω ∈ Ω : A(1)(ω) = 1, B(1)(ω) = ′1) = P(1, 0, ′1, 0) =
1
4
p11(1, 
′
1), . . . ,
P(ω ∈ Ω : A(2)(ω) = 2, B(2)(ω) = ′2) = P(0, 2, 0, ′2) =
1
4
p22(2, 
′
2).
We also consider the random variables which are responsible for
selections of pairs of ports to PBSs. For the device at LHS:
ηL(1, 0, 0, 
′
2) = ηL(1, 0, 
′
1, 0) = 1, ηL(0, 2, 0, 
′
2) = ηL(0, 2, 
′
1, 0) = 2.
For the device at RHS:
ηR(1, 0, 
′
1, 0) = ηR(0, 2, 
′
1, 0) = 1, ηR(0, 2, 0, 
′
2) = ηR(1, 0, 0, 
′
2) = 2.
8.3 Validity of CHSH-inequality for correla-
tions taking into account randomness of selec-
tion of experimental settings
Consider the correlations with respect to the probability P (which
takes into account randomness of selections of experimental settings),
< A(i), B(j) >=
∫
Ω
A(i)(ω)B(j)(ω)dP(ω). (5)
These are classical correlations for random variables taking values in
[-1,1] and for them the CHSH-inequality |S| ≤ 2, see (2), holds (The-
orem 1). Here S is defined by (1).
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We remark that
< A(i), B(j) >=
1
4
[ ∑
1,′1=±1
A(i)(1, 0, 
′
1, 0))B
(j)(1, 0, 
′
1, 0))p11(1, 
′
1)
+
∑
1,′2=±1
A(i)(1, 0, 0, 
′
2)B
(j)(1, 0, 0, 
′
2)p12(1, 
′
2)
+
∑
2,′1=±1
A(i)(0, 2, 
′
1, 0)B
(j)(0, 2, 
′
1, 0)p21(2, 
′
1)
+
∑
2,′2=±1
A(i)(0, 2, 0, 
′
2)B
(j)(0, 2, 0, 
′
2)p22(2, 
′
2)
]
.
Let us fix some setting, e.g., i = 1, j = 1. Then taking into account
the definitions of A(1) and B(1) we found that in the above expression
only the first summand is nonzero.Thus < A(1), B(1) >=
1
4
∑
1,′1=±1
A(i)(1, 0, 
′
1, 0))B
(j)(1, 0, 
′
1, 0))p11(1, 
′
1) =
1
4
∑
1,′1=±1
1
′
1p11(1, 
′
1).
Thus classical correlations (taking into account randomness of set-
ting selections) coincide (up to the factor 1/4) with the correlations
corresponding to the probability measures (pij) :
Cij ≡
∑
i,′j=±1
i
′
jpij(i, 
′
j), (6)
namely,
Cij = 4 < A
(i), B(j) > . (7)
In particular, we can select the probabilities (pij) as the EPR-Bohm
probabilities for the singlet state, see (1), then Cij are the EPR-Bohm
correlations used to violate the CHSH-inequality.
We stress that the correlations Cij are larger than classical ones.
In the general case, see footnote ?,
Cij =
1
P(i, j)
< A(i), B(j) > . (8)
Thus randomization washes out a part of correlation. However, this
washing effect is the probabilistic reality: in any CHSH-test experi-
mentalists have to determine selection of experimental settings.9
9 If one ignores this fact, then his/her description of the CHSH-test would not match the
real experimental situation; an important part of randomness involved in the experiment
would be missed. The specialty of this sort of randomness is that it is not present in
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8.4 Quantum correlations as conditional clas-
sical correlations
In classical probability theory one uses the notion of conditional ex-
pectation of a random variable (under the condition that some event
occurred). This notion is based on Bayes’ formula defining conditional
probability, see (1). We shall use this notion to definite conditional
correlation – under the condition that the fixed pair (i, j) of experi-
mental settings is selected.
Let (Ω,F ,P) be an arbitrary probability space and let Ω0 ⊂
Ω, Ω0 ∈ F , P(Ω0) 6= 0. We also consider an arbitrary random variable
ξ : Ω→ R. Then the conditional mathematical expectation (average)
of the random variable ξ, conditioned to the event Ω0, is defined as
follows:
E(ξ|Ω0) =
∫
Ω
ξ(ω)dPΩ0(ω),
where the conditional probability PΩ0 is defined by Bayes’ formula
(1): PΩ0(U) ≡ P(U |Ω0) = P(U ∩ Ω0)/P(Ω0). Let us come back to
our unifying probability space. Take in the above definition
Ω0 ≡ Ωij = {ω ∈ Ω : ηL(ω) = i, ηR(ω) = j}.
We remark that P(Ωij) = 1/4. The latter implies that
E(A(i)B(j)|ηL = i, ηR = j) =
∫
Ω
A(i)(ω)B(j)(ω)dPΩij(ω) (9)
= 4
∫
Ωij
A(i)(ω)B(j)(ω)dP(ω) = 4
∫
Ω
A(i)(ω)B(j)(ω)dP(ω) = 4 < A(i), B(j) >
(since the product A(i)(ω)B(j)(ω) is nonzero only on the set Ωij).
Hence, we have:
E(A(i)B(j)|ηL = i, ηR = j) ≡ 4 < A(i), B(j) > . (10)
By comparing (7) and (10) we obtain that the correlations Cij which
correspond to the collection of probabilities (pij) coincide with the
classical conditional correlations, condition with respect to the choice
of experimental setting.
the formalism of QM. The experimenters decide which random variables ηL and ηR are
selected to choose the experimental settings. This situation may be disturbing for those
who try to describe the whole experiment by QM. One has either to recognize that a part
of randomness involved in the CHSH-test is not represented in the quantum formalism or
to ignore this randomness by considering simply the correlations (6) computed for the fixed
experimental settings without taking into account randomness of selection of settings.
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Thus, we can identify the correlations Cij obtained with the aid of
probabilities (pij) with the corresponding conditional correlation for
the unifying Kolmogorov space:
Cij = E(A
(i)B(j)|ηL = i, ηR = j). (11)
We were able to embed the correlations Cij collected (separately) for
in general incompatible experimental settings into the classical prob-
ability space. We remark that in principle by themselves these cor-
relations can have the non-Kolmogorovian structure. It can happen
that there is no a single classical probability space in which Cij can
be considered as unconditional correlations.
In particular, we can select the probabilities (pij) as the EPR-
Bohm probabilities for the singlet state, see (1). Then we obtain the
representation of the corresponding quantum correlations as classical
conditional correlations.
Hence, the quantum correlations are present in our classical prob-
ability model for the CHSH-test, but they are not simply correlations:
they are conditional conditional; cf. with the embedding of the hyper-
bolic plane (the Poincare´ model) into the Euclidean place, the lines of
the hyperbolic plane are not simply Euclidean lines.
8.5 Violation of the CHSH-inequality for clas-
sical conditional correlations
As we have seen, the CHSH-inequality is satisfied for classical (un-
coditional) correlations (5).
Is there any reason to expect that it is also satisfied for classical
conditional correlations?
The answer is no. In the classical probability model Theorem 1
can be proven only for unconditional correlations. Thus in principle
conditional correlations can violate the CHSH-inequality. And this is
not surprising from the Kolmogorovian viewpoint. Set
SC = E(A
(1)B(1)|ηL = 1, ηR = 1) + E(A(1)B(2)|ηL = 1, ηR = 2) (12)
+E(A(2)B(1)|ηL = 2, ηR = 1)− E(A(2)B(2)|ηL = 2, ηR = 2)
(here “C” is the abbreviation for conditional”). By using the equality
(10) we obtain that
SC = 4S. (13)
Since by general Theorem 1 the quantity S is majorated by 2, the
quantity SC is majorated by 8. But the upper bound 8 is really too
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rough and, to obtain a better upper bound, we have to proceed more
carefully.
Theorem 2. (“Strong CHSH-inequality”) Let A(i), B(j), i, j =
1, 2, be random variables defined as (3), (4). Then the corresponding
combination of correlation S, see (1), satisfies the stronger version of
the CHSH-inequality:
|S| ≤ 1. (14)
Proof. Consider classical correlation< A(i), B(j) >=
∫
ΩA
(i)(ω)B(j)(ω)dP(ω).
We state again that the product A(i)(ω)B(j)(ω) is nonzero only on the
set Ωij and P(Ωij) = 1/4. We also use the condition that all random
variables are valued in [-1,1]. Hence, in fact,
| < A(i), B(j) > | =
∣∣∣ ∫
Ωij
A(i)(ω)B(j)(ω)dP(ω)
∣∣∣ ≤ P(Ωij) = 1/4.
Thus each correlation in the combination S of four correlations is
bounded by 1/4. Hence, the inequality (14) holds.
We remark that, for this concrete Kolmogorov space, the CHSH-
inequality is “trivialized”; in particular, the signs of correlations in S
do not play any role. We remark that this theorem is valid for any
collection of probabilities (pij), see (2).
Corollary 1. (CHSH-inequality for conditional correlations.) Let
A(i), B(j), i, j = 1, 2, be random variables defined as (3), (4). Then the
corresponding combination of conditional correlation SC satisfies the
inequality:
|SC | ≤ 4. (15)
Take now probabilities given by (1), the EPR-Bohm probabilities
for the singlet state. For them SC = 2
√
2 and the inequality (15) is
not violated.
9 Discussion
9.1 On the use of data from incompatible ex-
perimental contexts in statistics
Our previous analysis of the CHSH-experiment showed that one has to
be very careful by operating with statistical data collected in incom-
patible “sub-experiments” of some “compound experiment.” However,
we do not claim that one cannot use such incompatible data to derive
some statistical conclusions. As was pointed by Richard Gill (email
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exchange) data collected for incompatible experimental contexts is
widely used in statistics, especially in medicine:
“For instance we compare the health of non-smokers who are pas-
sively exposed to cigarette smoke (living with a smoking partner),
with those who don’t. The conclusion is that a lifetime of exposure
roughly doubles your risk of lung cancer and other smoking related
negative outcomes: doubled from something tiny, to something also
tiny.”
Two experimental contexts, C1 : “living with a smoking partner”,
and C2 : “not”, are incompatible, we are not able to collect statistics by
using the same person in both contexts. Nevertheless, we compare the
probability distributions p(·|Ci), i = 1, 2, to come to conclusions. Is
such a practice acceptable from our viewpoint? Definitely yes. We can
do everything with these contextual probabilities, but we should not
forget that they are contextual, i.e., they are not so to say “absolute
Kolmogorovian probabilities.”
In the same way in the CHSH-experiment, we can compare the
probabilities pij(, 
′) and say that , for one pair of angles (one exper-
imental context) the probability of, e.g., the (+,+)-configuration is
larger than for another pair (another context).
Even in medical experiments we can apply the construction of the
underlying Kolmogorov space which was constructed for the CHSH-
data. Only in this space we can work with probabilities by using the
laws of classical probability theory, but absolute probabilities are less
than contextual-conditional, this is the result of taking into account
randomness of selections of the contexts C1 and C2. This should be
remembered. And it seems that statisticians remembered this dif-
ference between “absolute” and conditional probabilities. (May be I
wrong, but then those who treated p(·|Ci), i = 1, 2, as “absolute prob-
abilities” might (but need not) get the problems which are similar to
the problems generated by violation of Bell’s inequality for quantum
systems.)
We also point out that, although in medical statistics the data
from incompatible experimental contexts is widely used (as Richard
Gill stressed), in another domain (where statistical methods also play
the crucial role), namely, cognitive psychology and related studies in
game theory and economics, the similar use of such data is considered
as leading to ambiguous conclusions and paradoxes [59], [82]-[84], see
[59] for contextual probabilistic analysis of the situation. This sit-
uation is enlighten well in games of the Prisoner’s Dilemma type.
There are the following incompatible contexts: C+ (C−): one prisoner
knows that another will cooperate (not) with her and C : she has
no information about the plans of another prisoner [59]. In cognitive
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psychology and behavioral economics there was collected a plenty of
statistical data for such games in different setups. As was pointed
out, for psychologists comparison of such data led to paradoxes. We
remark that non-Kolmogorovness of data collected for the contexts
C+, C−, C is demonstrated via violations of the formula of total prob-
ability. This formula, as well as Bell’s inequality, can be considered
as a test of non-Kolmogorovness. I proposed to use this test in cogni-
tive science, psychology, and economics in [85]. The first experimental
study was devoted to recognition of ambiguous figures, see Conte at
al. [87]. Later Jerome Bussemeyer coupled violation of the formula
of total probability with data collected in games of the Prisoner’s
Dilemma type and with violation of the Savage Sure Thing Principle
[86]. The latter axiomatizes the rationality of players, in particular,
of agents acting at the market. Generally in cognitive psychology
non-Kolmogorovness was coupled to irrationality of players or more
generally the presence of some bias. We also remark that in cognitive
psychology Bell’s type inequalities are also used as statistical tests of
non-Kolmogorovness, see Conte et al. [88], Asano et al. [60].
9.2 Consistent histories
The consistent histories interpretation of quantum mechanics provides
a similar viewpoint on violation of Bell’s inequality [66].
This approach (opposite to the majority of other approaches) is
heavily based on the use of the Kolmogorov axiomatics of probabil-
ity theory in quantum physics. The adherents of consistent histories
proceed at the mathematical level of rigorousness, they “even” define
explicitly the spaces of elementary events serving different quantum
experiments [66] (which is very unusual for other approaches).
If a set of histories is consistent, then it is possible to introduce
a probability measure on it, i.e., to use the Kolmogorov probability
model. The crucial point is that in quantum physics there exist in-
consistent families of histories, so quantum measurements cannot be
described by a single probability space; quantum probability theory
is non-Kolmogorovian. The violation of Bell’s inequality is explained
in the same way as in the present paper as a consequence of the non-
Kolmogorovian structure of experimental data collected for different
experimental contexts. In particular, the nonlocality issue is irrela-
tive(as well as in the present paper). However, the consistent histories
approach stops at this point, i.e., recognition of non-Kolmogorovness.
I proceeded further and showed that, in fact, quantum probabilities
can be considered as the classical conditional probabilities and that
the Kolmogorov model covers even the quantum probabilities.
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Finally, we remark that in the consistent histories approach there
are no conterfactuals as well as in our approach.
9.3 Hidden variables
Our model of embedding of the quantum probabilities in the Kol-
mogorov model can be considered as an extension of the space of
hidden variables to include parameters generating selections of exper-
imental settings. Such a hidden variable depends on the parameters
for the selections of angles at both labs. One can say that a hidden
variable is nonlocal (although observed quantities are local). However,
this nonlocal structure of a hidden variable reflects the nonlocal setup
of the experiment, and nothing else.
9.4 On the contribution of Bell to foundations
of probability
It is clear that not everybody would agree to call Bell as the Copernicus
of Probability. In particular, after the publication of the preprint [63],
I got a few comments such as, e.g.,
“Regarding the title of your work, “Bell as the Copernicus of Prob-
ability”, I think you may be overdoing things. Whereas I very much
admire Bell’s work and think he made some very important contribu-
tions to quantum foundations, he did not solve its fundamental mea-
surement problem (as is evident from his ”Against Measurement”),
and so far as I can tell he had not the slightest idea of how to apply
standard (Kolmogorov) probability, or some modification of it, to re-
solve the quantum mysteries. He did not provide the inspiration for
my CH ideas, and I think that is also true for my colleagues who were
in on its development. He did apply ideas of probability to draw con-
clusions about (classical) hidden variables, but that seems to rather
different from Copernicus’ putting the sun at the center of the solar
system, an idea that did work (even if Copernicus’ formulation of it
left something to be desired.) I am not sure you want to call Bell the
Ptolemy of Probability, though that might be more accurate. While
I think it appropriate to honor great men for their achievements, we
don’t do so by an excessive hero worship.”
And such a position is understandable, because Bell really did not
proceed by using the standard for modern probability theory formal-
ism of the Kolmogorov probability space and he did not point explic-
itly to violation of Kolmogorovness by data collected in experimental
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tests of this inequality. However, the impact of his work to the proba-
bilistic foundations of quantum mechanics and the foundations of the-
ory of probability in general was really great! Without Bell’s works [1],
[2] the development of quantum probability would be concentrated on
merely mathematical issues without the direct connection with exper-
iment. The key point is that in Bell’s framework the assumption on
the existence of a single probability distribution serving to four incom-
patible measurements and the possibility of its experimental testing
enlightened (at least for experts in foundations of quantum mechanics
and probability theory) the role of (non-)Kolmogorovness. Of course,
the main problem was (as I pointed out in few my recent publications,
e.g., [64]) that Bell as the majority of physicists did not get a proper
education in probability theory. Therefore it was difficult for him to
formulate explicitly the thesis about the non-Kolmogorovian structure
of his argument. However, he prepared the soil and the harvest is re-
ally good, see, e.g., [33], [35] for reviews. Therefore I compared Bell
with Copernicus, although I agree that comparisons with other heroes
of science might be more appropriate.
Finally, I remark that in general Bell’s works played the crucial role
in stimulation of the presently growing interest to quantum founda-
tions, e.g., [90]. Older experts in quantum foundations told me that in
1960th quantum foundations were not considered as a serious field of
research in physics; they were treated merely as philosophical games.
As Alain Aspect told me, at his PhD defense he was asked whether he
had some job opportunities, and the members of jury were happy that
he already got the offer for the permanent position. It was completely
clear that with such a topic as the (first!) experimental violation of
Bell’s inequality he would never find job.
10 Conclusion
The analogy between the evolutions of geometry and probability and
their impacts to physics support the scientific methodology based on
construction of mathematical models of physical phenomena. By this
methodology the development of physics can be treated as transition
from one mathematical model to another. We compare the contribu-
tion of Bell to probability with the contribution of Lobachevsky to
geometry. Violations of Bell type inequalities imply rejection of the
classical model of probability (Kolmogorov, 1933); quantum probabil-
ity based on Born’s rule is an example of non-Kolmogorovian prob-
ability. We propose to use this purely probabilistic interpretation of
violations of Bell type inequalities. Such an interpretation is very nat-
ural from the viewpoint of analogy with geometry – the use of non-
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Euclidean models plays the fundamental role in special and general
relativity. We also discuss the logical aspects of “Bell’s revolution” in
foundations of probability as leading to rejection of Boolean logic and
the applications of quantum logic. Again by exploring the analogy
between geometry and probability we come to the problem of embed-
ding of a non-Kolmogorov probability (e.g., quantum probability) into
the Kolmogorov model. We illustrate this problem by the CHSH-test
(and probabilities generated by it) as an example. We show that it
is possible to embed the CHSH-probabilities and correlations (which
have the intrinsic non-Kolmogorovian structure) into the Kolmogorov
model. Our embedding is based on accounting randomness of selection
of the experimental settings in the CHSH-test. In such an approach
the quantum correlations are interpreted as the classical conditional
correlations with respect to selection of the fixed experimental set-
tings. Even in the classical (Kolmogorovian) probability approach
such conditional correlations can violate the CHSH-inequality. Thus
we explain the violation of the CHSH-inequality by quantum correla-
tions without appealing to nonlocality or rejecting realism.
As in geometry, the same quantum probabilistic structure can be
embedded into the Kolmogorov model in various ways. In this paper
we discussed only one possibility based on the treatment of quan-
tum probabilities for the CHSH-experiment as conditional probabil-
ities. And we used a special sort of conditioning: on the selection
of the angles of PBSs. Other sorts of conditioning can serve for the
same purpose. For example, in [72] quantum correlations violating the
CHSH-inequality were obtained as the result of conditioning on the
simultaneous exceeding of the detection threshold by the two (of the
four) components of a classical random field passing two (two channel)
PBSs. Conditioning on the simultaneous (more generally coincidence
window) detection was used in [73]–[75], but for particle-like classical
systems (see [76] for a review on the computer simulation approach
to violations of Bell’s inequality; see also [7] for another approach to
computer simulation for violation of Bell’s inequality).
We remark that in this paper the present experimental status of vi-
olations of Bell’s inequality was not discussed at all. The main reason
for this is that our argument does not depend on complete justifica-
tion of experimental violations of Bell’s inequality, i.e., on closing of
various loophole (and first of all the locality and detection efficiency
loopholes).
We point out that in [28], [29] Khrennikov and Volovich formulated
an analog of the Heisenberg uncertainty principle for these loopholes
(or more precisely the Bohr complementarity principle): they cannot
be closed jointly in a single experimental test. (Here the “detection
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efficiency” is treated as the efiiciency of the complete experimental
scheme.) The argument used by the authors of [28], [29] were of the
heuristic nature. The recent studies on the asymptotic of the space-
time dependence of the EPR-Bohm-Bell correlations [78]–[80] support
at least implicitly the Khrennikov-Volovich uncertainty principle for
Bell’s test. However, as was emphasized, from the viewpoint of the
probabilistic opposition all these problems with closing experimental
loopholes are not important. Our position would not change even if
the final loophole free experimental test demonstrating violation of
Bell’s inequality were performed.
Bell’s inequality is just one of various tests of non-Kolmogorovness
of quantum probabilities (if they are not treated as conditional prob-
abilities). For example, R. Feynman considered the two slit exper-
iment as a test of nonclassicality of quantum probability [81]. He
did not know about the modern mathematical model of probability,
Kolmogorov, 1933. Therefore he spoke about Laplacian classical prob-
ability. Feynman’s argument in the modern probabilistic fashion was
presented, e.g., in [91] – [93], [41].
We recall that violations of Bell’s inequality can be modeled not
only with the aid of quantum probability, but even with the aid of
other nonclassical probabilistic models. For example, negative prob-
abilities were widely explored, see [41] for a detailed review, see also
[95] for a recent study. In [22], [24] I used so called p-adic probabilities
[41], [94], [96]. (In principle, such models are not less exotic than the
quantum probabilistic model based on representations of probabilities
with the aid of Born’s rule. The latter became commonly accepted
through extensive applications.) Roughly speaking this is merely the
matter of test whether to explore the complex probability amplitudes
and Born’s rule, or signed, or even p-adic valued probabilities for the
mathematical representations of quantum correlations. However, it
seems that from the formal representational viewpoint the complex
Hilbert space representation is the most convenient, in particular be-
cause it is linear.
One can also proceed another way around: to represent the classi-
cal probabilities in the quantum-like manner, with the aid of complex
probability amplitudes or in the abstract framework with the aid of
vectors from complex Hilbert space. This is so-called inverse Born’s
problem. It was studied in very detail in [35], see also [97], [98].
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Appendix: Representation of events by
subspaces, quantum logic
Bell’s “theorem” is a consequences of the mathematical structure of
QM. While classical probability theory is based on the set-theoretical
description, QM is founded on the premise that events are associ-
ated with subspaces (or orthogonal projectors on these subspaces) of
a vector space, complex Hilbert space. The adoption of subspaces as
the basis for predicting events also entails a new logic, the logic of
subspaces (projectors) which relaxes some of the axioms of classical
Boolean logic (e.g., commutativity and distributivity).
First time this viewpoint that QM is based on a new type of logic,
quantum logic, was expressed in the book of von Neumann [61], where
he treated projectors corresponding to the eigenvalues of quantum
observables (represented by Hermitian operators) as propositions, see
also [62]. The explicit formulation of logic of QM as a special quantum
logic is based on the lattice of all orthogonal projectors. For reader’s
convenience, below we present the mathematical structure of quantum
logic.
10.0.1 Logical operations on for projectors
For an orthogonal projector P, we set HP = P (H), its image, and vice
versa, for subspace L of H, the corresponding orthogonal projector is
denoted by the symbol PL.
The set of orthogonal projectors is a lattice with the order struc-
ture: P ≤ Q iff HP ⊂ HQ or equivalently, for any ψ ∈ H, 〈ψ|Pψ〉 ≤
〈ψ|Qψ〉.
We recall that the lattice of projectors is endowed with operations
“and” (∧) and “or” (∨). For two projectors P1, P2, the projector R =
P1∧P2 is defined as the projector onto the subspace HR = HP1 ∩HP2
and the projector S = P1 ∨ P2 is defined as the projector onto the
subspace HR defined as the minimal linear subspace containing the
set-theoretic union HP1∪HP2 of subspaces HP1 , HP2 : this is the space
of all linear combinations of vectors belonging these subspaces. The
operation of negation is defined as the orthogonal complement.
In the language of subspaces the operation “and” coincides with
the usual set-theoretic intersection, but the operations “or” and “not”
are nontrivial deformations of the corresponding set-theoretic opera-
tions. It is natural to expect that such deformations can induce devi-
ations from classical Boolean logic.
Consider the following simple example. Let H be two dimensional
Hilbert space with the orthonormal basis (e1, e2) and let v = (e1 +
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e2)/
√
2. Then Pv∧Pe1 = 0 and Pv∧Pe2 = 0, but Pv∧(Pe1∨Pe2) = Pv.
Hence, for quantum events, in general the distributivity law is violated:
P ∧ (P1 ∨ P2) 6= (P ∧ P1) ∨ (P ∧ P2) (1)
As can be seen from our example, even mutual orthogonality of the
events P1 and P2 does not help to save the Boolean laws.
We remark that for commuting projectors quantum logical opera-
tions have the Boolean structure. Thus noncommutativity can be con-
sidered as the algebraic representation of nonclassicality of quantum
logic. In particular, for a single observable with purely discrete spec-
trum A =
∑
λ λPλ, the projectors corresponding to different eigenval-
ues are orthogonal and, hence, they commutate. Therefore deviations
from classical logic and probability can be found only through analysis
of results of a few incompatible measurements.
A the first sight the representation of events by projectors/linear
subspaces might look as exotic. However, this is simply a prejudice
of the common use of the set-theoretic representation of events in
the modern classical probability theory. The tradition to represent
events by subsets was firmly established by A. N. Kolmogorov [3] only
in 1933. We remark that before him the basic classical probabilistic
models were not of the set-theoretic nature. For example, the main
competitor of the Kolmogorov model, the von Mises frequency model
[77], was based on the notion of a collective, see [41] for formulation
of QM on the basis of the von Mises model.
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